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Abstract. Purpose is crucial for privacy protection as it makes users
confident that their personal data are processed as intended. Available
proposals for the specification and enforcement of purpose-aware policies
are unsatisfactory for their ambiguous semantics of purposes and/or lack
of support to the run-time enforcement of policies.
In this paper, we propose a declarative framework based on a first-order
temporal logic that allows us to give a precise semantics to purpose-aware
policies and to reuse algorithms for the design of a run-time monitor
enforcing purpose-aware policies. We also show the complexity of the
generation and use of the monitor which, to the best of our knowledge,
is the first such a result in literature on purpose-aware policies.
1 Introduction
An important aspect of privacy protection is the specification and enforcement of
purposes, i.e. users should be confident that their data are processed as intended.
For instance, email addresses are used only for billing but not for marketing
purposes. Unfortunately, as already observed several times in the literature (see,
e.g., [20] for a thorough discussion), both specifying and enforcing purposes turn
out to be difficult tasks.
Specification. Following the seminal paper [35], the specification of privacy con-
straints consists of establishing when, how, and to what extent information about
people is communicated to others. In the context of IT systems, this amounts to
define policies governing the release of personal data for a given purpose. Such
policies are contributed by the users of a system, also called data owners, and the
organization running the system. The latter, besides enforcing their own policies,
are also required to take into account laws, regulations, and directives imposed
by local, national, and community governamental bodies. From a technological
point of view, these policies are usually mapped to access control policies aug-
mented with purpose constraints, which we call purpose-aware policies (some-
times called privacy-aware access control policies in the literature, see, e.g., [11]).
In this paper, we do not consider the problem of deriving purpose-aware policies
from the high-level and heterogenous privacy requirements mentioned above. We
assume that this has been done and focus instead on the basic building blocks
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of the models and specification languages underlying the policies. As observed
in [19,20], such building blocks are data-centric and rule-centric policies. In the
former, every piece of information is associated with the purposes for which it
can be used; examples are the policies in [9] or those expressed in the XACML
Privacy Profile.3 In the latter, rules specify under which conditions subjects can
perform some action on a given piece of information for some purpose; examples
are those in [24,11] and those expressed in EPAL.4 Data-centric policies more
easly support the expression of the privacy preferences of data owners while
rule-centric policies permit the expression of complex constraints imposed by
laws, regulations, and best-practices adopted by organizations to handle per-
sonal data. Thus, both data- and rule-centric policies should be supported for
the specification of purpose-aware policies.
One of the most serious problems in purpose-aware policies is the lack of
semantics for purposes, which are usually considered as atomic identifiers. This
gives rise to arbitrariness in the interpretation of purposes; e.g., if the policy of
a company states that emails of users are collected for the purpose of communi-
cation, this allows the organization to use emails for both billing and marketing
when the majority of users has a strong preference for the first interpretation
only. To solve this problem, several works have observed that “an action is for a
purpose if it is part of a plan for achieving that purpose” [32]. Among the many
possible ways to describe plans, one of the most popular is to use workflows, i.e.
collections of activities (called tasks) together with their causal relationships,
so that the successful termination of a workflow corresponds to achieving the
purpose which it is associated to. We embrace this interpretation of purpose and
avoid ambiguities in its specification by using a temporal logic which allows us to
easily express the causal relationships among actions in workflows associated to
purposes. Additionally, the use of a logic-based framework allows us to express in
a uniform way, besides purpose specifications, also authorization (namely, data-
and rule-centric) policies together with authorization constraints, such as Sepa-
ration/Bound of Duties (sod/bod). While temporal logics have been used before
for the specification of authorization policies (see, e.g., [25]) and of workflows
(see, e.g., [13]), it is the first time—to the best of our knowledge—that this is
done for both in the context of purpose-aware policies. In particular, the capabil-
ity of specifying sod or bod constraints—which are crucial to capture company
best practices and legal requirements—seems to be left as future work in the
comprehensive framework recently proposed in [20].
Enforcement. Enforcing purpose-aware policies amounts to check if (C1) a
user can peform an action on a certain data for a given purpose and (C2) the
purpose for which a user has accessed the data can be achieved.
(C1) is relatively easy and well-understood being an extension of mechanisms
for the enforcement of access control policies (see, e.g., [14] for an overview)
by considering the combined effect of rule- and data-centric policies. This is
so because tasks are executed under the responsibility of users and tasks may
3 docs.oasis-open.org/xacml/3.0/xacml-3.0-privacy-v1-spec-cd-03-en.pdf
4 www.w3.org/Submission/2003/SUBM-EPAL-20031110
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perform actions on data. To permit the execution of a task t by a user u, it is thus
necessary to check if u can perform all the actions Acts associated to t (under
a given rule-centric policy) and the data—on which Acts are performed—are
released by their data owners (under a given data-centric policy).
(C2) is much more complex than (C1) as it requires to foresee if there ex-
ists an assignment of users to tasks that allows for the successful termination
of the workflow. This is so because—as discussed above—a purpose is associ-
ated to a workflow so that its successful execution implies the achievement of
the purpose. The problem of checking (offline) if a workflow can successfully
terminate, known as the Workflow Satisfiability Problem (wsp), is already com-
putationally expensive with one sod [33], and moreover, the on-line monitoring
of authorization constraints requires to solve several instances of the wsp [12].
For purpose-aware policies, this implies that it is necessary to solve an instance
of the wsp per user request of executing a task in the workflow associated to a
given purpose.
Contributions. The paper provides the following contributions:
– The specification of a comprehensive framework for expressing purpose-aware
policies which are a combination of data- and rule-centric policies together
with workflows augmented with authorization constraints (Section 3 and, in
particular, Figure 1). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time au-
thorization constraints are considered and naturally integrated in a purpose-
aware setting.
– The semantic formalization of purpose-aware policies as formulas in first-
order temporal logic (Section 3.1).
– The provision of formal techniques not only for the (on-line) enforcement of
purpose-aware policies, but also for their (off-line) analysis, together with
decidability and complexity results (Section 4).
The choice of a first-order (linear-time) temporal logic for the semantics of
purpose-aware policies has three main motivations. First, since both data- and
rule-centric policies can be seen as access control policies, the use of first-order
logic formulae to express them is adequate following the established tradition
of expressing a wide range of access control policy idioms in (fragments of)
first-order logic; see, e.g., [22,3]. In the rest of this paper, we do not elaborate
further on this issue as it is well-studied and focus on aspects more closely re-
lated to purposes. We just remind that answering a request of performing an
action on an object by a user can be efficiently done (linear time in the size
of the authorization query) as shown in, e.g., [22,3]. The second motivation for
choosing a temporal logic comes from the declarative approach to the speci-
fication of workflows proposed in [34,2] which provides a formal semantics to
their executions. The third motivation is the adaptation and reuse of available
results [18,15,16] concerning logical problems in a combination of first-order and
linear-time temporal logic to which verification problems for purpose-aware poli-
cies can be translated. Additionally, it allows us to reuse available algorithms
for solving logical problems on top of which a module for the the enforcement
of purpose-aware policies can be built.
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A running example (Section 2) introducing the main issues related to
purpose-aware policies is used throught the paper to illustrate the main concepts
of our framework. Related work and conclusions are also discussed (Section 5).
2 Running example
We describe a running example, based on Smart campus5, which will be used
throughout the paper. Smart campus is a platform in which citizens, institu-
tions and companies can communicate with each other by exchanging data and
services. It provides functionalities to access information about transportations,
social services, education, and user profiles. These services allow companies to
build new applications and thus offer new services to citizens. In this kind of
scenario, personal data of users is the main ingredient to provide customized
services. Indeed, users should be confident that the services access only the data
required to their needs and use them for the right purposes. Additionally, service
providers should comply with laws, regulations, and best practices in handling
data mandated by local governments, the European Union, and enterprises. In
other words, access to personal data must be mediated by appropriate autho-
rization policies augmented with purpose constraints so that only authorized
subjects have the right to access certain data for a given purpose. Following an
established line of works (see, e.g., [20] for an overview), we assume that the
purpose of an action is determined by its relationships with other, interrelated,
actions.
For concreteness, we illustrate these ideas by considering the situation in
which some personal data of users in the Smart campus platform (namely, the
work experience and the academic transcripts) is accessed by JH, a job hunting
company, for the purpose of finding jobs to students. JH has deployed in the
Smart Campus platform the service depicted of Figure 1 (upper half), specified
in the Business Process Model and Notation (bpmn). The swim lane labelled
‘Student’ contains the activities (also called tasks) that must be executed under
the responsibility of the data owner and the swim lane labelled ‘JH company’
shows the activities that employees of JH are supposed to perform for the pur-
pose of finding some jobs to the data owner. First of all, an employee of JH per-
forms an interview to the student to understand his/her job preferences. Then,
the student decides to give or not his/her consent for JH to access his/her aca-
demic transcripts by executing either task optIn or task optOut, respectively (the
empty diamond before the two tasks in Figure 1 is an exclusive-or gateway). If
he/she opts in, an employee of JH can access both his/her academic transcripts
and past experience (by executing both getExms and getExp since the diamond
containing the plus sign before the two tasks in Figure 1 is a parallel gateway);
otherwise, only the student past experiences can be accessed. Based on the in-
terview and the collected personal information, an employee of JH search for
jobs the student can be interested in (task findJobs) and some other employee
proposes him/her some of them (task propJobs). Finally, the students decides
5 http://www.smartcampuslab.it
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interview
3optIn ∨ 3optOut
∧
¬(3optIn ∧ 3optOut)
(¬(getExms ∨ getExp)
U
(optIn ∨ optOut))
∧
(¬getExsmU optIn)
(¬findJobs
U
(getExms ∨ getExp))
∧
(3findJobs
∧
findJobs →◦propJobs)
3(chooseJob
∨
abort)
Fig. 1: The JobHunting workflow expressed in bpmn (upper half) and as a (par-
tial) set of ltl formulae (lower half).
if choosing one of the jobs or to abort the process (tasks chooseJob and abort,
respectively). Further authorization constraints are imposed on which employees
can execute task interview, findJobs, and proposeJobs: the first two must be exe-
cuted by different employees to keep the overall process unbiased—this is called
a Separation of Duty (sod) constraint—whereas the first and last tasks must
be executed by the same employee so that the student gets in contact with the
same person of JH—this is called a Bind of Duty (bod) constraint. (In Figure 1,
these constraints are shown as dotted lines connecting the tasks labelled by the
distinct 6= or equal = sign in case of sod or bod, respectively.)
To summarize, the workflow specification is used to specify the purpose of an
activity (task) with respect to all the others that must be executed for achiev-
ing the given purpose. From now on, we assume that a workflow is uniquely
associated to a purpose or, equivalently, that the semantics of a purpose is its
associated workflow.
Since the tasks in the workflow are executed under the responsibility of a
user (e.g., an employee of JH), he/she must have the right to access such data.
For instance, the task getExp takes as input the list of past job experiences of the
student. The employee of JH executing this task must have the right to access
such a list and the student should have given the consent to access this informa-
tion to (an employee of) JH. In other words, every time an employee of JH asks
to execute an activity for the purpose of finding jobs, he/she not only must have
the right to do so according to the authorization policy of the company but also
the student (data owner) should agree to release the information for the purpose
of finding jobs. In other words, there are two types of policies that must be taken
into account when granting the right to execute a task to an employee: one is
called rule-centric, and constrains access by considering subjects, actions, and
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data objects while the other is called data-centric, and is such that data owners
constrain access to their data objects for certain purposes only. For instance, in
the job hunting scenario, the rule-centric policy specifies that employee bob has
the right to read the list of job experiencens of students and the data-centric
policy specifies that student sam’s academic transcripts can be accessed for the
purpose of JobHunting.
Notice the subtle interplay between purposes, described by workflows, and
authorization policies. For instance, the execution of certain tasks can modify
both rule- and data-centric policies as it is the case of optIn and optOut in
Figure 1. When executing the latter, the execution of the task getExms is skipped
in the current instance of the workflow despite the fact that sam has agreed to
disclose such information according to the above data-centric policy (for which
sam’s academic transcripts can always be used for the purpose of jobHunting).
This flexibility allows us to model certain data directive for privacy (see, e.g., [1])
in which the data owner must explicitly give his/her consent to access his/her
personal data, every time it is requested.
Finally, observe that handling purposes in presence of authorization con-
straints (such as sod or bod) requires to solve, at run-time, the Workflow Sat-
isfiability Problem (wsp) [12], i.e., to be able to answer the question: does there
exist an assignment of authorized users (according to the rule- and data-centric
policies) to workflow tasks that satisfies the authorization constraints (sod or
bod)? The wsp is known to be a computationally expensive activity; it is already
NP-hard with one sod constraint [33]. To make things even more complex, at
run-time, we need to solve several instances of the wsp, one per user request of
executing a task in a workflow associated to a purpose. This is so because to
solve an instance of the wsp, it is sufficient to find an execution sequence of task-
user pairs containing all the tasks in a workflow. In the job hunting scenario,
consider the initial request of an employee u0 to execute task interview. This
implies to check whether there exists a sequence pi = (interview, u0), pi
′ of task-
user pairs form which is a successfull execution of the workflow. For instance, if
pi′ is (optOut, sam), (getExp, u0), (findJobs, u1), (propJobs, u0), (abort, sam), then
pi represents a succesfull execution of the workflow when sam decides to opt
out and not releasing his academic transcript to JH. However, this implies only
that the wsp is solvable and the sequence represents a possible future execution.
Imagine now that sam decides to opt in: pi′ is useless and a new instance of
the wsp must be solved to find a successful execution of the workflow of the
form (interview, u0), (optIn, sam), pi
′′ for some sequence pi′′. Notice that, even if
sam decides to opt out, the sequence pi′ may be useless, provided that a user u2
distinct from u0 is granted the possibility to execute task getExp.
3 A Declarative Framework for Purpose-aware Policies
On the left of Figure 2, it is shown an entity-relationship diagram describing
the conceptual organization of our framework (rectangles represent sets of enti-
ties and diamonds relationships among them). We have DataOwners who own
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Subjects
uses
Actions
DataObjects
rcpdef
Purposes
dcp DataOwners
Workflows
Tasks
cont
sod/
bod
Data-centric policies
Rule-centric
policies
Purpose
specification
dcp ⊆ DataObjects ×DataOwners × Purposes
rcp ⊆ Subjects ×Actions ×DataObjects
def : Purposes →Workflows
cont ⊆ Workflow × Tasks
uses ⊆ Tasks ×Actions ×DataObjects
sod ⊆ Workflows × Tasks × Tasks
bod ⊆ Workflows × Tasks × Tasks
Fig. 2: Conceptual representation of the data-, rule- and purpose-centric policies.
DataObjects and decide the Purposes for which these can be accessed by means
of a data-centric policy (relation dcp). Subjects can perform certain Actions
on DataObjects according to a rule-centric policy (relation rcp). Purposes are
defined (relation def ) in terms of Workflows which are composed of Tasks (re-
lation cont) and sod or bod constraints; each task can perform some Actions on
DataObjects (relation uses).
On the right of Figure 2, it is shown the formal characterization of the rela-
tionships as subsets of the cartesian products of the appropriate sets of entities.
To illustrate, recall the running example in Section 2:
– the rule- and data-centric policies “bob has the right to read the list
of job experiencens of students” and “sam’s academic transcripts can
be accessed for the purpose of JobHunting” can be specified by rela-
tions rcp and dcp which are such that6 rcp(bob, read, jobExpList) and
dcp(academicTranscript, sam, jobHunting);
– if ϕ is the specification of the workflow in the upper half of Figure 1 (we
explain below what is ϕ), then def (JobHunting) = ϕ (notice that def is a
total function from Purposes to Workflows, i.e. every purpose is associated
to a workflow);
6 Given an n-ary relation R, we write R(e1, ..., en) for (e1, ..., en) ∈ R.
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– the sod and bod contraints in Figure 1 can be specified by relations sod and
bod such that sod(ϕ, interview, findJobs) and bod(ϕ, interview, propJobs);
– the fact that, for example, tasks interview and optIn are part of the worflow
specification ϕ can be specified by a relation cont such that cont(ϕ, interview)
and cont(ϕ, optIn);
– the fact that the task interview reads the user profile can be specified by a
relation uses such that uses(interview, read,UserProfile);
We now explain how we specify workflows in our framework. Following the declar-
ative approach in [2], we have chosen Linear-time Temporal Logic (ltl) as the
specification language. The main reason for this is two-fold. First, well-known
techniques (see, e.g., [21]) are available to translate procedural descriptions of
workflows (e.g., that in the upper half of Figure 1), and more in general con-
current systems, to ltl formulae. For instance, the lower half of Figure 1 shows
an (incomplete) set of ltl formulae (to be read in conjunction) corresponding
to the bpmn workflow in the upper half. The first conjunct on the left means
that interview must be the first task to be executed, formula ¬getExmsU optIn in
the third conjunct of the figure means that the academic transcripts cannot be
accessed if the student has opted out. Formula ¬findJobsU(getExms∨getExp) in
the fourth conjunct means that the execution of task findJobs must not happen
before the execution of getExms or getExp.
The second reason for chosing ltl to specify workflows is that it allows us to
derive a precise semantics of purpose-aware policies and to reuse available tech-
niques for the off-line and on-line verification of formulae to support the analysis
of policies at design-time and their enforcement at run-time. Such verification
tasks are presented in Section 4. Here we focus on the semantics of purpose-
aware policies, starting with the meaning of ltl formulae, which are expressions
of the following grammar:
ϕ ::= a | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | ◦ϕ | ϕ1 U ϕ2 | 2ϕ | 3ϕ with a ∈ Prop
where Prop is a set of Boolean variables representing tasks. Intuitively, ◦ϕ
means that ϕ holds at the next instant, ϕ1 U ϕ2 means that at some future
instant ϕ2 will hold and until that point ϕ1 holds, 2ϕ means that ϕ always
holds, and its dual 3ϕ that ϕ eventually holds. Since we assume workflows
to eventually terminate, we adopt the finite-trace semantics in [15,16]. The only
notable aspect of this semantics (with respect to the standard semantics as given
in, e.g., [21]) is that ◦ϕ is true iff a next state actually exists and it satisfies
ϕ. The models of ltl formulae are finite sequences of Boolean assignments to
the variables in Prop indexed over natural numbers, which represent instants
of a linear and discrete time. The idea is that at a certain time instant, the
Boolean variable representing a task is assigned to true iff the corresponding
task has been executed. As customary in workflow specifications, we assume
that one task only is executed at a time. By looking at a sequence of Boolean
assignments satisfying a formula, we can thus understand which tasks have been
executed and which are not. In other words, a sequenceΠ of Boolean assignments
satisfying a formula ϕ, in symbols Π |= ϕ, correspond to a possible execution
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of the workflow described by ϕ (see [15,16] for a precise definition). The set of
all sequences satisfying a formula ϕ, i.e. the set of all successful executions of
the workflow described by ϕ, is called its language and is denoted by L(ϕ). It
is possible to build an automaton (i.e., a finite-state machine) from a formula
ϕ accepting exactly all the traces belonging to L(ϕ); see again [15,16] for the
description of the procedure for doing this.
We can now define the notion of purpose-aware policy as a tuple
P = (DataOwners,Subjects,DataObjects,Actions,Tasks,
Workflows,Purposes, dcp, rcp, sod , bod , cont , def )
whose components are as explained above.
As it is standard in access control models, we introduce the notion of a
request as a tuple (wid , sub, tsk , do, p) where sub ∈ Subjects, tsk ∈ Tasks,
do ∈ DataOwners, p ∈ Purposes, and wid belongs to the set Wid of work-
flow identifiers (allowing us to distinguish among different executions of pos-
sibly the same workflow). Intuitively, (wid , sub, tsk , do, p) means that subject
sub asks the permission to execute task tsk on the data objects owned by the
data owner do in the workflow instance wid for the purpose p. The relation
req ⊆ Wid × Subjects × Tasks × DataOwner × Purposes contains all possible
requests.
3.1 Semantics of purpose-aware policies
We explain how a request (wid , sub, tsk , do, p) is granted or denied according to
a purpose-aware policy P. The idea is to derive a first-order ltl formula from
the ltl formula def (p) constraining the ordering of requests such that the rule-,
data-centric policies and sod and bod constraints are satisfied. Thus, instead of
sequences of Boolean assignments, we consider first-order models which differ
for the interpretation of requests only. For the sake of brevity, we do not give a
formal semantics of first-order ltl on finite-traces but only some intuitions and
refer the interested reader to [18] for the details.
First of all, we observe that every workflow instance can be considered in iso-
lation since the framework presented above allows one to specify only constraints
within a workflow instance and not accross instances. For this reason, we intro-
duce an operator to identify requests referring to the same workflow instance wid
out of a trace Π containing requests referring to arbitrary workflow instances, i.e.
Π|wid = req1(wid, sub1, tsk1, do1, p), . . . , reqn(wid, subn, tskn, don, p) is the trace
representing the evolution of the specific workflow instance wid. Notice that re-
quests in Π|wid share the same workflow identifier wid and purpose p whereas
subjects, tasks, and data owners may be different. Given a purpose-aware policy
P, for each purpose p ∈ Purposes such that def(p) = ϕ, we build a (first-order)
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ltl formula Φp := ϕ ∧ Λ ∧Σ ∧B where
Λ :=
∧
cont(ϕ,t)
t↔ ∃sub, do.
(
req(wid, sub, t, do, p)∧∧
uses(act,t,obj) dcp(do, obj, p) ∧ rcp(sub, act, obj)
)
Σ :=
∧
sod(ϕ,t1,t2)
ξ(t1, t2,=) ∧ ξ(t2, t1,=)
B :=
∧
bod(ϕ,t1,t2)
ξ(t1, t2, 6=) ∧ ξ(t2, t1, 6=)
ξ(t, t′, ./) :=2∀sub, sub′.
(∀do.req(wid, sub, t, do, p)∧
3∀do.req(wid, sub′, t′, do, p)
)
→ sub ./ sub′ .
Formula Λ says that in order to execute task t for purpose p, we need to check
that subject sub who has requested to execute it is entitled to do so according to
both the rule- and data-centric policies in P, thus formalizing the check (C1) in
the introduction. Formulae Σ and B encode the sod and bod constraints in P,
respectively, which are both derived from the same template formula ξ(t, t′, ./),
saying that if a request for executing t′ is seen after that for executing t, then
the two subjects performing such tasks must be either different (when ./ is 6=,
i.e., in case of a sod) or equal (when ./ is =, i.e., in case of a bod). Formulae ϕ,
Σ and B, thanks to their temporal characterization, formalize the check (C2) in
the introduction. A sequence of requests Π|wid for a purpose p and an instance
wid of the workflow def (p) satisfies the purpose-aware policy P iff Π|id |= Φp.
By abusing notation, we write L(ϕ) for all such sequences. Given a sequence
σ of (previous) requests, a (new) request r = (wid, sub, tsk , do, p) is granted by
the purpose-aware policy P iff wid is an instance of the workflow def (p) and
there exists a sequence σ′ of requests such that σ, r, σ′ is in L(ϕ); otherwise, it
is denied.
To illustrate some of the notions introduced above, let us consider the first-
order ltl formula that can be derived from the example in Section 2. As already
observed, the formula ϕ associated to the purpose JobHunting is the conjunction
of the formulae in the lower half of Figure 1. The conjunct in Λ for interview is
interview↔ ∃sub, do.
 req(wid, sub, interview, do, jobHunting)∧dcp(do, userProfile, jobHunting)∧
rcp(sub, read, userProfile)
 .
The formula representing the sod constraint between interview and findJobs is
2∀sub, sub′.
(∀do.req(wid, sub, interview, do, jobHunting)∧
3∀do.req(wid, sub′, findJobs, do, jobHunting)
)
→ sub 6= sub′ ∧
2∀sub, sub′.
(∀do.req(wid, sub, findJobs, do, jobHunting)∧
3∀do.req(wid, sub′, interview, do, jobHunting)
)
→ sub 6= sub′ .
Notice that the second conjunct above can be dropped without loss of generality
since, from def (jobHunting), it is possible to derive that it is never the case that
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task findJobs is executed before task interview. From a complete specification of
the purpose-aware policy P for the running example, it is not difficult to see
that the request r0 = (wid, bob, interview, sam, jobHunting) is granted by apply-
ing the definition given above as follows. First, take σ to be the empty sequence
as r0 is the first request. Second, we can derive that task interview can be ex-
ecuted from the formula for interview above and the fact that P is such that
dcp(sam, userProfile, jobHunting), i.e. sam decided to release his user profile for
the purpose of job hunting, and rcp(bob, read, userProfile), i.e. bob has the right
to read user profiles. Third, take σ′ = r1, r2, r3, r4, r5 for
r1 := (wid, sam, optOut, sam, jobHunting) r2 := (wid, bob, getExp, sam, jobHunting)
r3 := (wid, adam, findJobs, sam, jobHunting) r4 := (wid, bob, propJobs, sam, jobHunting)
r5 := (wid, sam, choosJob, sam, jobHunting)
where r1 corresponds to the fact that sam has opted out and only his past expe-
riences can be released, r2 to the fact that bob can retrive sam’s past experiences
(as said in Section 2), r3 to the fact that the jobs for sam are found by adam, who
is distinct from bob in order to satisfy the sod constraint between interview and
findJobs in Figure 1 (indeed, we assume that bob can execute getExp according
to P), r4 to the fact that the list of found jobs is proposed to sam by bob in
order to satisfy the bod constraint between interview and propJobs in Figure 1,
and r5 to the fact that sam decides to pick a job from the proposed list.
We close the Section by remarking that this technique allows to discover
inconsistencies as soon as they occur, i.e., at the earliest possible time. This
is sometimes called early detection in the bpm literature, and it is a no-
table feature of temporal logics. To explain the concept, assume that, ac-
cording to P, only bob can perform the activities of jobHunting: when r0 =
(wid, bob, interview, sam, jobHunting) (or actually any other request for purpose
jobHunting) is presented to the system, we are able to understand that no execu-
tion can ever successfully complete the workflow, as sooner or later task findJobs
must be executed by someone different from bob which however does not have
the rights to do it. As a result, r0 is denied and hence bob is not granted to
access the data even if, by observing the current state, there is no evidence yet
of any violation.
The decidability and complexity of answering requests is studied in the fol-
lowing section.
4 Policies verification
We now formalize, provide a solution and give complexity results to the following
verification tasks:
Purpose achievement problem : given a purpose-aware policy P and a purpose
p, is it possible to successfully execute workflow def (p)? That is to say: is
it possible to assign tasks to subjects such that policy P is satisfied and the
workflow successfully terminates?
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. . . . . .
9sub, do.
req(wid, sub, getExp,
do, jobHunting)
. . .
. . .
q0
q7 q8
req(wid, sub1, interview,
do, jobHunting) ^
sub1 6= sub4
req(wid, sub4, findJobs,
do, jobHunting) ^
sub1 6= sub4
Fig. 3: An excerpt of the pre-automaton for formula ΦjobHunting.
Runtime policy enforcement : given a purpose-aware policy P, the current work-
flow execution trace pi, and a new request ri, can ri be granted or must be
denied in order for the workflow to eventually terminate (check (C2) in the
introduction) and such that the sequence of granted request always satisfies
P (check (C1))?
4.1 Purpose achievement problem
Technically speaking, this problem amounts to check, given a purpose p in a
purpose-aware policy P, if Φp is satisfiable, i.e., if there exists a trace Π|wid
(where wid is a generic identifier for workflow def (p)) such that Π|wid |= Φp.
We adopt an automata-based approach to solve the problem, which consists
in building the automaton for Φp and check if there exists a path to a final
state. Since Φp is first-order, we exploit the modularity of our framework and
the of symbolic techniques in [18] to build the automaton with a reasonable com-
plexity. Indeed, we notably separate sub-formulas in Φp checking the workflow
(ϕ), checking rcp/dcp (Λ) and checking sod/bod constraints (Σ,B). Moreover,
we observe that while ϕ and Σ,B typically remain fixed as they describe the
workflow, rcp and dcp policies may occasionally change. From these consider-
ations, we decouple the construction of the automaton checking the workflow
constraints only, which we call pre-automaton, from that taking also care of rcp
and dcp, called specialized -automaton, so as when rcp and dcp change, we do
not need to re-compute the automaton from scratch, but we just “adapt” the
already computed pre-automaton to the new policies.
The pre-automaton is a finite-state machine with edges labeled with first-
order formulas. Figure 3 shows an excerpt of the pre-automaton for ΦjobHunting,
where we notice that variables for subjects involved in sod or bod constraints are
free, i.e., not bounded by any quantifier. Indeed, as tasks interview and jobHunting
must be executed by different subjects (sod), variables for such subjects, namely
sub1 and sub4, are free and must be different.
Theorem 1. Given a purpose-aware policy P, and a purpose p with def (p) = ϕ,
the construction of the pre-automata Ap requires exponential space in the number
of temporal operators of ϕ, sod and bod.
Proof (sketch). Automaton Ap is built from Φp using the algorithm for
the propositional case over finite traces [15], by simply ignoring constraint∧
uses(act,t,obj) dcp(do, obj, p) ∧ rcp(sub, act, obj) and quantifiers ∀sub1, sub2 of
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sub-formulas Σ and B and considering first-order atoms as propositional sym-
bols (see [18] for details). Observing that ϕ, Σ and B are the only sub-formulas
which contains temporal operators, and hence, the only source of complexity,
and recalling that building the automaton for a propositional formula requires
exponential space in the number of temporal operators [15], i.e., 2|ϕ,bod,sod| in
the worst case, the claim follows. uunionsq
A pre-automaton can be specialized to take into account a specific set of
rcp and dcp by simply adding, to each edge labeled with req(wid, sub, t, do, p),
the constraint
∧
act,obj∈uses(act,t,obj)(dcp(do, obj, p) ∧ rcp(sub, act, obj)). Notice
that such an operation is legitimate as sub-formulas (Λ) checking rcp and dcp
do not contain any temporal operators. The resulting specialized-automaton
Ap is a symbolic structure where we check whether there is a way to reach
a final state—thus solving a workflow satisfiability problem—by trying to
satisfy formulas on edges. Indeed, satisfy a formula (w.r.t. P) precisely means
assigning a task to a subject which is authorized by P to perform it. Consider,
e.g., formula ∃sub, do.req(wid, sub, findJobs, do, jobHunting) on edge from q7
to q8 in Figure 3: its corresponding formula in the specialized automaton is
∃sub, do.req(wid, sub, findJobs, do, jobHunting)∧uses(act,findJobs,obj) dcp(do, obj, p)∧
rcp(sub, act, obj). Assuming that bob has the rights to perform getExp, the
substitution bob/sub satisfy the formula according to P, and so that edge can
be use to build a path to a final state. Analogously, the assignment bob/sub1
and adam/sub4 satisfies formulas on edges from q0 and q8 respectively. When
no such an assignment can be found, the workflow cannot be successfully
completed given policy P.
Theorem 2. Given a finite purpose-aware policy P and a purpose p with
def (p) = ϕ the purpose achievement problem can be solved in exponential time
in the size of ϕ, sod and bod.
Proof. Given a specialized automaton Ap, in the worst case all possible assign-
ments to variables in edges must be checked. Such assignments are finite as the
purpose P is finite and exponential in the number of variables. Actually, it can be
proven (see [18]) that it is enough to try substitutions for subjects involved in sod
and bod constraints only, which usually are of a much smaller number. This is
because sod and bod constraints generate variables which occur throughout the
whole automaton (across-state variables) and are the only source of complexity
(such as sub1 and sub4 in Figure 3). Any other variable, instead, is local, i.e., it
occurs in a specific formula only, whose formula can be checked for satisfiability
by simply querying P. For each substitution to across-state variables a reachabil-
ity test to a final state (linear in the size of the automaton) must be performed.
From Theorem 1, we get time complexity of |Subjects||sod,bod| · 2|ϕ,bod,sod|.
4.2 Runtime policies verification
Given a sequence pi of (previous) requests and a new request r, should we allow
r or not?
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Traditional ltl semantics presented in the previous Section is not adequate
for evaluating requests at runtime, as it considers the trace Π seen so far to
be complete. Instead, we want to evaluate the current request by considering
that the execution could still continue and this evolving aspect has a significant
impact on the evaluation: at each step, indeed, the outcome may have a degree
of uncertainty due to the fact that future executions are yet unknown.
Consider, e.g., that so far request r0 has been granted, where r0 :=
(wid, bob, interview, sam, jobHunting) is as in the previous Section. Assume that
now request r1 := (wid, sam, optOut, sam, jobHunting) is presented and must be
evaluated: we may be tempted to use the traditional ltl semantics, which re-
turns pi : r0, r1 6|= Φp because some constraints have not been satisfied (such as:
“eventually findJobs must be executed”) but this is not a good reason to deny
request r1, as the workflow execution will not stop after r1 (and actually any
other single request different from r1 would not have satisfied Φp anyway).
A more complex analysis is hence required, which assesses the capability of a
partial trace to satisfy or violate a formula ϕ in the future by analyzing whether
it belongs to the set of prefixes of L(ϕ) and/or the set of prefixes of L(¬ϕ).
Roughly speaking, let pi : r0, r1 be as before: we want to check if there exists a
possible sequence of future requests pi′ : r2, r3, . . . rn such that pi, pi′ |= Φp and,
if this is the case, we grant request r1. We can actually be more precise, and
evaluate the current request in four different ways.
Given a (partial) trace pi, a formula Φp and a new request r, we adopt the
runtime semantics in [15] which is such that:
– pi, r |= [Φp]rv = temp true, when pi, r temporarily satisfies Φp, i.e., pi is
currently compliant with Φp, but a possible system future prosecution may
lead to falsify Φp;
– pi, r |= [Φp]rv = temp false, when that the current trace temporarily falsify
Φp, i.e., pi, r is not current compliant with Φp, but a possible system future
prosecution may lead to satisfy Φp;
– pi, r |= [Φp]rv = true, when pi, r satisfies Φp and it will always do, no matter
how it proceeds;
– pi, r |= [Φp]rv = false, when pi, r falsifies Φp and it will always do, no matter
how it proceeds.
A new request r is denied if pi, r |= [Φp]rv = false, and granted otherwise.
Intuitively, every time a new request is presented, we check that: (i) from the
current automaton state there exists an outgoing edge whose formula is satisfied
by the current request (which corresponds to check (C1) in the introduction)
and (ii) from the arrival state there exists a path to a final state, which is a
wsp that exactly corresponds to check (C2). Such analyses are performed on
an automaton which is different from the one presented in the previous Section,
as it not only has to check prefixes of Φp, but also that of ¬Φp, in order to
distinguish among the four cases above (see [15] for details). However, the same
idea of the pre- and specialized automata also apply to this case.
Once the specialized-automaton has been computed, the current sequence
of requests is analyzed. Notice that, differently from the offline verification,
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assignment of users to tasks are partially given by the current and previous
requests, and hence we have to check if such partial assignments can be ex-
tended, according to policy P, in order to reach a final state. Consider again
r0 := (wid, bob, interview, sam, jobHunting) to be the already granted request
and r1 := (wid, sam, optOut, sam, jobHunting) to be the current one. Request
r0 provides the assignment bob/sub1 which forces us to solve the wsp with the
additional constraint of sub1 = bob. Actually, r0, r1 |= [Φp]rv = temp false, as
r0, r1 6|= Φp but there exists a sequence of assignments of users to tasks that even-
tually satisfies it, which is sequence r2, r3, r4, r5 shown in the previous Section.
We remark that a wsp instance must be performed each time a new request is
presented. Indeed, the actual next request rˆ2 (still unknown at the current time)
is in general different from r2, and hence sequence r2, r3, r4, r5 found at this step
as a witness of a possible future execution is of no use as the system progresses.
Notably, the fact that we discover inconsistencies at the earliest possible time
(early detection) allows us to block workflow executions exactly when a possible
successful path can still be followed. When this is not guaranteed, the online
enforcement is inefficient as when the precise point of deviation from the right
path is unknown: (i) possible several tasks are executed before realizing the in-
consistency (hence several data are accessed thus breaking the security) and (ii)
possibly it is too late to recover the execution.
Theorem 3. Given a purpose-aware policy P and a purpose p with def (p) = ϕ,
the runtime policy verification requires, at each step, exponential time in the size
of ϕ, sod and bod.
Proof (sketch). The construction of the specialized automaton for monitoring
incoming requests for workflow def (ϕ) require the same complexity of the au-
tomaton in Theorem 1 (see [15] and [18]). When a new request r is presented, a
wsp instance must be solved, as explained in [18]. Being the complexity of wsp
as in Theorem 2, the claim follows. uunionsq
5 Discussion and Related Work
We have presented a declarative framework to specify and enforce purpose-aware
policies. In the literature, several proposals have attempted to characterize the
notion of purpose in the context of security policies. Some of them (e.g., [10])
propose to manage and enforce purpose by self-declaration, i.e. subjects explic-
itly announce the purpose for accessing data. While this provides a first effort
to embody purpose in access control policies, these approaches are not able to
precent malicious subjects from claiming false purposes. Other works (e.g., [29])
propose to extend the Role Based Access Control model with mechanisms to
automatically determine the purpose for which certain data are accessed based
on the roles of subjects. The main drawback of these approaches is the fact that
roles and purposes are not always aligned and members of the same role may
serve different purposes in their actions. Other approaches (e.g., [11]) are based
on extensions of (Attribute Based) Access Control models for handling personal
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data in web services or (e.g., [30]) on extensions of Usage Control models for
the distributed enforcement of the purpose for data usage (see, e.g., [28]). The
main problem of these approaches derives from the limited capability of the
application initiating the handling of personal data to control it when this has
been transferred to another (remote) application in the distributed system. Our
framework avoids this problem by assuming a central (workflow-based) system
acting as a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) intercepting all requests of exe-
cuting a particular action on certain data. Such an architecture for the PEP is
reasonable in cloud-based environments (e.g., the Smart Campus platform briefly
described in Section 2) in which services and applications are implemented via of
Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) so that remote applications provide
only the user interface while the control logic is executed on the cloud platform
and can thus be under the control of the central PEP.
The common and more serious drawback of the approaches considered above
is that they fail to recognize that the purpose of an action (or task) is determined
by its position in a workflow, i.e. by its relationships with other, interrelated,
actions. This observation has been done in more recent works—e.g., [32,27,20]—
and is also the starting point of our framework in this paper. We share the effort
of formalizing the notion of purpose as a pre-requisite of future actions. In future
work, we would like to study how hierarchical workflows (i.e. workflows contain-
ing complex activities, specified in terms of lower level tasks) can be expressed
in our framework so as to capture the specification of purposes as high-level
activities as done in [20]. The main difference with previous works is our focus
on run-time enforcement of purpose-aware policies while [32] and [27] on audit-
ing. Furthermore, the formal framework adopted to develop these proposals are
different from ours: [32] uses Markov Decision Processes, [27] a process calculus,
and [20] an ad hoc modal logic. These choices force the authors of [27,20] to
design algorithms for policy enforcement or auditing from scratch. For instance,
[20] gives a model checking algorithm on top of which a run-time monitor for
purpose-based policies can be implemented, without studying its complexity. In
contrast, we use a first-order temporal logic which comes with a wide range
of techniques to solve logical problems (see, e.g., [15]) that can be reused (or
adapted) to support the run-time enforcement of purpose-aware policies. For in-
stance, we were able to derive the first (to the best of our knowledge) complexity
result of answering authorization requests at run-time under a given purpose-
aware policy: exponential time in the number of authorization constraints (The-
orem 3). This complexity is somehow intrisic to the problem when assuming that
the purpose of an action is determined by its position in a workflow, as we do
in this paper. As a consequence, achieving a purpose amounts to the succesful
execution of the associated workflow, which is called the Workflow Satisfiability
Problem (wsp) in the literature [12] and is known to be NP-hard already in the
presence of one sod constraint [33]. Several works have proposed techniques to
solve both the off-line [33,26] and the on-line [6,8] version of the wsp but none
considers purpose-aware policies as we do here.
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Indeed, we are not the first to use first-order ltl for the specification of
security policies. For example, [25] shows how to express various types of sod
constraints in the Role Based Access Control model by using first-order ltl.
However, the paper provides no method for the run-time monitoring of such
constraints and do not discuss if and how the approach can be used in the
context of workflow specifications. Instead, the work in [13] uses (a fragment of
propositional) ltl to develop algorithms for checking the successfull termination
of a workflow. Both works do not discuss purpose-aware policies. To the best of
our knowledge, only the approach in [4] shares with ours the use of first-order
ltl to specify and enforce utility and privacy in business workflows. The main
difference is in the long-term goal: we want to give rigorous foundation to spec-
ification and verification techniques for purpose-based policies, while [4] is seen
as a first step towards to the development of a general, clear, and comprehensive
framework for reducing high-level utility and privacy requirements to specific op-
erating guidelines that can be applied at individual steps in business workflows.
It would be an interesting future work to see if and how the two approaches can
be combined together in order to derive purpose-aware policies from high-level
privacy requirements typically found in laws, directives, and regulations.
Our choice of using a first-order ltl formula (Section 3.1) as the semantics
of purpose has two main advantages. First, it allows us to reuse well-known
techniques to specify access control policies, what we call data- and rule-centric
policies, by using (fragments of) first-order logic (see, e.g., [22,3]). Second, it
allows us to reuse the techniques for the specification and enforcement of work-
flows put forward by the declarative approach to business process specification
in [2,34,23]. However, these works focus on tasks and their execution constraints,
disregarding the security and privacy aspects related to accessing the data ma-
nipulated by the tasks. A first proposal of adding the data dimension to this
approach is in [17], which has been from which we have borrowed the construc-
tion of the automata for off-line and on-line verification in this paper (Section 4).
The choice of considering first-order ltl over finite instead of infinite traces goes
back to [16] in which it is argued that this is the right choice for business process
which are supposed to terminate as the workflows associated purposes, which
can be achieved in this way. In general, monitoring first-order ltl formulae is
undecidable [7] but, under the finite domain assumption, [18] shows decidability.
Such an assumption is reasonable in our framework where subjects are usually
employees of a company (e.g., the job hunting organization in Section 2) whose
number is bounded. Our verification techniques are also related to mechanisms
for enforcing security policies, such as [28,5,31]. However, these works mainly
focus on access or usage control policies and are of limited or no use for purpose-
based policies considered in this paper.
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